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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
COMMENTS
Coastal Land Use Development: A Proposal for Cumulative Area-Wide
Zoning
INTRODUCTION
Concern about the environment has crescendoed in recent months.'
Many states, including North Carolina, have taken vigorous steps to
protect the air and water.2 Few, however, if any, have taken necessary
action to deal with the most significant environmental problem:
uncontrolled land development, 3 especially in the regions contiguous to
coastal waters.
Any program of controlled land use must be balanced. For
example, before rushing to bring heavy industry to depressed coastal
areas, one must consider the possible effects of attendant pollution on
North Carolina's multi-million dollar fishing industry.4 Against the
aesthetic desire for quiet and undeveloped beaches must be balanced the
state's economic need to share in a portion of this nation's beach
recreation business, which will hit a national high of 5,400,000,000
dollars by 1975. 5
The key to a balanced development of economic and environmental
resources lies in placing some measure of authority in a state or regional
agency. This agency must have the authority to deal with pollution by
population masses as well as the more newsworthy instances of
industrial waste. Three-quarters of the nation's population already live
'See generally Evans, Regional Land Use Control: The Stepping Stone Concept, 22 BAYLOR L.
REv. 1 (1970); Johnson, Developments in Land Use Control. 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 399 (1970);
Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. Rev. 458 (1970).
'See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211 TO -
215.22 (Supp. 1969).
3Intelligent land-use planning and management provides the single most important
institutional device for preserving and enhancing the environment and for maintaining
conditions capable of supporting a quality life while providing the material means
necessary to improve the national standard of living.
This statement comes from the policy position of the National Governors' Conference, August
1970, in Hearings on S. 3354 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 774 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 3354].
'See H.R. Doc. No. 91-286, Part II, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 120-24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. Doc. No. 91-286].




in a coastal or Great Lakes state,6 and the projected rate of growth for
these states exceeds the national average.7 Already, too, pilots speak of a
continuous string of lights from Boston to Norfolk.
8
This uncontrolled growth and development, so often countenanced
under nineteenth century concepts of individual freedom, threatens to
engulf the freedom of all who would walk quietly along a beach listening
to surging waves speak to consoling dunes, or of those who would spend
weekends as latter-day Hemmingways fighting the denizens of the deep.
Even the less aggressive who want only the quiet crackle of flounder
frying in an outdoor skillet will soon find the campsite surrounded by
two-hundred-room motels.
In a full year's study, the President's prestigious Stratton
Commission9 produced a broad program that has become the polestar
for national congressional action 0 and that should provide the goals for
affirmative action to regulate the coastal region in North Carolina. The
Commission condensed the plethora of possibilities into four categories:
[1] Planning-to make comprehensive plans for the coastal waters and
adjacent lands and to conduct the necessary studies and investigations.
[2] Regulation-to zone; to grant easements, licenses, or permits; and
to exercise other necessary controls for ensuring that use of waters and
adjacent lands is in conformance with the plan for the area.
[3] Acquisition and eminent domain-to acquire lands when public
ownership is necessary to control their use. (Condemnation procedures
should be used if necessary.)
[4] Development-to provide, either directly or by arrangement with
other government agencies, such public facilities as beaches, marinas,
and other waterfront developments and to lease lands in its jurisdiction,
including offshore lands."
These are heroic goals and, necessarily, long range ones. However,
work toward establishing such a program should begin at once. This
comment will present a brief discussion of the planning phase and the
type of governmental authority that will be required to handle the full
1H.R. Doe. No. 91-42, Part 11,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 111-10 (1969).
71d.
Bid.
'The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, chaired by J.A. Stratton,
was established by the Act of June 17, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-454, § 5, 80 Stat. 203 (codified in 33
U.S.C. §§ 1101-24 (1970)).
"See, e.g., S. 2802,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969); H.R. 15099, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
11-1.R. Doc. No. 9142 at 59.
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undertaking. The writer's primary purpose is to offer one
proposal-cumulative area-wide zoning-for regulating land use and
development in North Carolina's coastal zone.
THE PROPER AUTHORITY
Two major questions must be answered with regard to the
implementation of any plan of land use regulation: At what level of
government will primary administrative controls lie? By what type of
agency will the program be administered? The answers to these questions
will, in large measure, dictate the effectiveness of the control devices.
Proper Level of Government
Once posited at any level of government, power is jealously
withdrawn from the public market and returned, if at all, slowly and
grudgingly. Zoning power is no exception as national, state, and local
governmental bodies seek to gain or to keep this key to local
development. The confusing, overlapping quagmire that ensues is
enough to boggle the mind; just how much actual power any particular
arm of government has is only temporarily unclouded when the
bureaucracies collide.
Initially, it is apparent that considerable control over land use does
rest with local city and county governments in North Carolina. Legal
support for this claim can be found in various statements by the General
Assembly. 12 Traditionally, there is an equally strong case to be made for
local control based on long years of state inactivity 3 and, as well, a
feeling of many that those closer to a problem's roots will deal with it
best.
Political obstructions warn the intermeddler that local government
officials will not remain passive to alterations in these "traditional
mechanisms by which the local governments guide physical developent
and establish a tax base."' 4 Strong political opposition can be expected
from representatives of city and county governments for any loss of
power. 5
"See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-172 to -181.2 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
"North Carolina and forty-eight other states have expressed no legislative interest in state-wide
programs of regulated land use. Hawaii is presently the only state with coordinated state-wide
planning and zoning. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -15 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
"Hearings on S. 2802 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 91-59, at 882 (1970) [hereinafter cited as




Conceding the validity of local interests in local affairs, there are
still good reasons that ultimate 6 authority for coastal development
should fiot rest in city and county hands. For one thing, most local
government structures do not have the staff or expertise necessary to
handle the complicated chores of planning and zoning on a
comprehensive scale.' 7 Nor have they indicated a willingness to become
actively involved given the opportunity. 8
A second objection to full local control centers around an extention
of the "forest-trees" colloquialism: Local government is a reflection of
the local population and, as such, reflects the narrowly restricted
anxieties and aspirations of those they represent. Elected officials are too
intimately involved with the problems and needs of their constituencies
to make the objective determinations that will affect the lives of all
North Carolinians as well as those from other states. For example, it has
been asserted that the erection of a fishing pier on a beach can affect
ocean tides miles away; 9 the deleterious effects of poor land use on
estuaries in this state may affect the fishing fortunes of sportsmen and
professional fishers from Hatteras to Cape Cod.
2 1
One writer well expressed the danger inherent in allowing absolute
local control over land development: "[M]unicipal competition rather
than municipal coordination shapes development. Each municipality, in
maximizing its position of advantage, ignores costs imposed on other
communities." ' 2' The tendency has been to look after local
needs-schools, welfare rolls, parks-without regard to area-wide
programs. For this reason "local governments have been most amenable
"
6The word "ultimate" is used here because, as the writer will later indicate, considerable
authority should be left with local government.
"7United States Senator Henry M. Jackson made this observation to the Association of
Counties in his home state of Washington: "There are more than 3000 counties in the United States.
It is apparent that, even if funds were available, the trained personnel do not exist to build a
technical organization in each county which would be competent to deal with the complex
environmental problems we face." Hearings on S. 3354 at 460.
'sln the spring of 1970, Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina initiated an exchange that
was to embarrass the cause of localists: "Isn't it a fact there are 18 coastal counties in North
Carolina?" The reply was positive. "And of that 18 only two of them have zoning ordinances and
you [New Hanover County] are one of them?" The reply was lost in evasion. Hearings on S. 2802,
at 885.
"Footprints on the Sands of Time: An Evaluation of the Texas Seashore, Report of the Interim
Beach Study Committee of the Texas Legislature, at 15 (1970).
"H.R. Doc. No. 91-286 at 123-24.
21Symposium: The San Francisco Bay Area-Regional Problems and Solutions, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 695, 699 (1967).
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to private interests" and this has kept the "degree of regulation to a
tolerable minimum at the expense of effectiveness." 2
The tug-of-war falls then between national and state governments.
Historically, the federal government has shown little interest in the
regulation of nonfederal property; however, recent congressional activity
indicates that this is no longer true. Last year's legislative efforts
produced scores of bills designed to give the federal government varying
degrees of control over the states' coastal regions.23
This flurry of activity is disconcerting to those who would keep
control of state property in state hands.24 The question in this instance is
not one of power, but of propriety. Surely, there is little doubt that the
Congress has the power to exercise control over all coastal zones under
either the war power?' or the commerce clause.26
Still, in spite of the fact that the federal government can take over
management of the coastal zone, there is some indication that strong,
effective" action by state government will leave Congress content to
exercise only minimal control. The Stratton Commission asserted:
"After reviewing the various alternatives . . . the Commission finds
that the States must be the focus for responsibility and action in the
coastal zone." '2 7 Bills introduced so far have deferred to the
Commission's call-the suggested federal role has been limited to
effecting coordination between states and federal agencies, to supplying
money to support the state programs, and to providing only general
guidelines and restrictions to insure a reasonable degree of uniformity
among state participants. 21
Therefore, while the opportunity is still present, state legislation
should be enacted to embody the general thrust of the Stratton
Commission report. The considerable financial benefits of whatever
coastal zone management bill is finally enacted will be available only to
those states that make a serious effort to implement a "comprehensive
2Delogu, Beyond Enabling Legislation, 20 ME. L. REv. i (1968).
23See Hearings on S. 3354 at 397-404.
"
2The Governor of North Carolina has indicated to Senator Jackson that he prefers to keep
control of the coastal region at the state level. Hearings on S. 3354 at 384.
25See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 326-28 (1936).2
'Although Quixotes might use the tenth amendment as a jousting pole, realists must read
recent cases such as Katzenbaeh v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298
(1969), as supporting the right of federal intervention. The tenuous economic links that had to be
constructed in those cases are not a problem in the commercially important coastal areas.
"H.R. Doc. No. 91-42 at 56.
2'See, e.g., H.R. 15099,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 14731, 91st Cong., (1969).
[Vol. 49
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plan [through a] single or coordinated agency [that has] all the necessary
regulatory authorities [including] zoning authority or authority to
override local zoning inconsistent with the state management plan. ' 29
Type of State Agency
A survey of other states' programs reveals that environmental
control may be coordinated and controlled in three basic ways: a single
agency or department, an interagency council, or a specially created
agency for particular problems.
Texas has enacted legislation calling for an interagency natural
resources council, with membership coming from administrative heads
of various departments of state government." As the government officer
with ultimate responsibility for the planning functions of this
interagency council, the governor is supported as well by a planning
division of the executive branch that is to serve as a "coordinating
catalyst. ' 31
California legislation has established a resources agency 3 under the
direction of an executive appointee33 who has general supervisory
authority over each unit within the agency. This is an effective tool in
the California setting because the units included in the resources agency
are the action arms of government: the Air Resources Board, the Water
Resources Board, the Department of Conservation, the Department of
Parks and Recreation, and others. 35 Therefore it is possible that
membership on this agency would be less honorary and power more
effectively used actively to enforce and implement the agency's decisions.
Breadth of approach coupled with large storehouses of manpower
and knowledge commend the interagency approach. However, the
advantages may be neutralized in operation. First of all, state
department heads are busy politicians; therefore committee assignments
may go to the underling with least to do and least with which to do it.
This type of organization also frequently fans the already hot fires of
"The quoted language comes from The National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1970,
H.R. 14731, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(b), at 6-7 (1969).
"TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4413 (32a) (Supp. 1970).
31 d.
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intergovernmental competition and jealousy. Finally, there is the risk
that the interagency approach will become the myriad-agency approach.
The number of governmental interests in the coastal margin is already
too great;3" adding yet another uncoordinated coordinating committee
will do little to relieve the problem of the government Medusa.3"
The Bay Area Conservation District (BACD) has had success in
dealing with the problems around San Francisco Bay where
uncontrolled building and discharge into the bay and the contiguous
land resulted in a polluted, nearly dead bay-area environment.38 The
efforts of the BACD, through a use of broad statutory powers, 3 have
sparked a recovery of the Bay in recent years.4" A new concept, untried in
practice, is New York's recently enacted legislation that establishes an
environmental protection corporation to deal with that state's uniquely
critical environmental crisis. 41 Exciting as these endeavors may be,
North Carolina's estuaries and coastlands are still relatively unspoiled4 1
so it would seem that neither special districting nor government
incorporation is necessary in North Carolina.
Perhaps the best type of agency to oversee land-use control, as well
as the attendant pollution problems, is the traditional department-level
agency, but such agency should be given increased powers to compensate
for the inactivity of past years. Recent Minnesota legislation transferred
the duties of conservation to a newly created Department of Natural
Resources. 43 This department has the duty, under the direction of its
commissioner, to "coordinate the management of the public domain"
and to develop a program to "conserve the natural resources of the
state." 44
3ln Senate hearings in 1970, Virginia's Director of Planning reported that Virginia had no less
than ten state agencies with a "rather direct interest" in coastal zone planning. He noted further
that not one had the necessary "authority and responsibility for coordinating the state's programs
and for focusing local efforts toward the achievement of comprehensive goals." Hearings on S. 2802
at 835.
3An example of this problem at the federal level was noted by Idaho's Senator Jordan who
observed the number of government agencies serving a 50 by 75 mile area of his home state, The
150,000 people in that area were being served by over twenty federal agencies in addition to eight
county governments and numerous municipalities. See Hearings on S. 3354 at 98.
13 H.R. Doc. No. 91-42 at 54.
UCAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 66600-61 (West Supp. 1970).
"See generally Symposium: The San Francisco Bay Area-Regional Problems and Solutions,
55 CALIF. L. REV. 695 (1967).
41N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1280-98 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
4"See H.R. Doc. No. 91-42 at 54.




The Massachusetts "Wetlands Act" gives this same general
coordinating control to the Commissioner of Conservation."5 Although
limited to the coastal areas designated as "wetlands," the powers given
the commissioner to protect the environment through regulation are
plenary.46
In 1970 New Jersey created the Department of Environmental
Protection .47 The legislation creating this agency is an admirable attempt
to deal with 'the full spectrum of resource problems. 48 Its major
shortcoming is a regressive section that separates conservation from
development by placing the Division of Economic Development in the
Department of Labor. 49 Otherwise, the act recognizes the critical
problem areas and offers commensurate tools for treatment. r
To gain the benefits of the proposed federal programs and to
manage effectively this state's rich coastal lands, North Carolina's
simplest vehicle would be a refined and well-oiled Department of
Conservation and Development. Specifically, this writer proposes the
creation of the North Carolina Coastal Zone Authority (NCCZA) to
manage land use in the coastal zone according to legislative standards.
The NCCZA should be an active arm of the Department of
Conservation and Development.
All state agencies should work not only with the NCCZA but also
through it in an attempt to insure that North Carolina does not
experience the bureaucratic tie-ups that have resulted in harmful
administration of other states' natural resources. Former Congressman
Richard Ottinger was speaking of just such Balkanization when he
observed: "If one characteristic stands out in the crisis of New York
Blight, it is the utter confusion of practically everyone involved. Too
many government bodies have some responsibility and some authority,
but no one had enough of either."5 The NCCZA should have enough of
both.
This means that implementation of such programs as air-pollution
'MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1970).
"Id.




"Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Government
Accountability, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 672 (1970).
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control, 52 water-pollution control,53 the dredge-and-fill law, 4 and others
should be coordinated through the enforcement arm of the NCCZA.
The complex nature of environmental issues dictates against
fragmentation. The Governor of Alaska could have spoken for North
Carolina when he said: "In a state . . . where the land use and water
utilization is so closely related, it is impractical to continue planning for
the use of our water resources without taking into account the
accompanying land use." ' s
A final word is offered about the policy guiding the selected
agency's administration of any program of land regulation. The state's
optimal future development lies along converging axes of economic
development and ecological protection. "The- task is easy," says one
congressman, "if all you do is say we are going to protect the
environment and you close everything down. What about the 26 million
people at the poverty level in this country?"56 With this in mind, the New
Jersey ation in separating conservation from development must be
viewed negatively. President Theodore Roosevelt, whose fame stems in
large measure from his conservation crusades, is reported to have said
that "conservation means development as much as it does protection."
Conversely, true "development" of a particular beach or marshland
might well require an absolute prohibition of any man-made alterations
in order to preserve the natural state. The land-planning project director
for the Stratton Commission, Dr. John Knauss, offered this
generalization: "We recommend as a guiding principle for the coastal
zone authorities the concept of fostering the widest possible variety of
beneficial uses so as to maximize net social return.""
As politics moves the state, so political pressures move the
bureaucrats.5 Just as state governments want control over land use
'
2N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-211 to 215.22 (Supp. 1969).
=Id.
51N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (Supp. 1969).
"Hearings on S. 3354 at 374.
"Id. 421.
"Hearings on S. 2802 at 60. It would be possible to misinterpret Dr. Knauss's words as
favoring business development over environmental protection. However, another's words act to
delimit: "[It] might [be] well [to] assert. . . the intent. . . to protect the value of natural systems
in the coastal zone and to provide for the accommodation of developmental uses in ways which
don't destroy the value of the natural systems." Hearings on Coastal Zone Management Before the
Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 91-14, at49 (1969).
-"For a recent and interesting commentary on this idea see Sax, A Little Sturm Und Drang At
Hunting Creek, ESQUIRE, Feb., 1971, at 84.
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planning and regulation, so do state government executives want control
over those who design and implement land-use planning. 9 Command of
land-development programs is now an executive function in at least
twenty states; many find refuge in a department resembling North
Carolina's Conservation and Development; others may be found in
finance, local affairs, or independent agencies."0 The trend in recent years
toward control by the governor's office" should be reversed, and the
control should be vested in a quasi-independent agency such as
Conservation and Development or Natural Resources.
Regardless of the method of administration chosen, a legislative
catalyst is needed to break inertia and provide North Carolina with an
aggressive agency processing both the responsibility and the authority
necessary to meet the challenges outlined by the Stratton Commission.
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
As conceived by its newer exponents, planning is a highly complex,
esoteric field far surpassing antiquated notions of pins, maps, and
markers.62 Today's planners use technical, computerized procedures
with heavy reliance on the latest sociological and psychological
theories.13 For this reason it is best to leave tactical methodology to the
planners themselves, since in any event their product must win approval
from those not mesmerized by techniques.
Planning also provides the cornerstone on which sound regulation is
based, and for this reason the legislature should set strategic guidelines.
For example, the General Assembly should dictate the policy
considerations that guide the making of the plan. One such consideration
might be irreparable harm to the natural environment. In fact, one
writer recommended that the entire scope of planning be centered around
the "Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public Land Policy," an approach
"See, e.g., letter from Governor Mandel of Maryland to Senator Jackson in Hearings on S.
3354 at 382.
£See generally Beyle, Seligson, and Wright, New Directions in State Planning, 35 J.A. INST.
OF PLANNERS 334, 335 (1969).
611d.
2See generally M. BRANCH, PLANNING: ASPECTS AND APPLICATIONS (1966); Branch,
Comprehensive Planning as a Field of Study, in PLANNING AND THE URBAN COMMUNITY 198
(1961); F. STUART, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING (2d ed. 1965).
3See generally H. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS (1968); Gans, Social and Physical Planning for
the Elimination of Urban Poverty, 1963 WASH. L.Q. 2 (1963); Webber, Comprehensive Planning
and Social Responsibility, 29 J.A. INST. OF PLANNERS 232 (1963).
"Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public Land Policy, 10 NAT. RES. J. 203 (1970).
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that dwells on prevention of irreparable harm while suggesting "the
possibility of public discussion based on empirical principles of public
interest in environmental quality and in the self-renewing capabilities of
the natural systems.165
Beyond the broader policy restrictions there are other areas that
require legislative guidance and control. Even though a dynamic
comprehensive plan is, by definition, being continuously updated, a total
review should be required at set intervals.6 The law should require that
the completed plan look a definite number of years into the future in
anticipating development and land-use demand. For example, one
proposed federal bill would require participating states' comprehensive
plans to span fifty years into the future. 7
While general planning theory should be determined by those most
familiar with the subject, the legislature may want to dictate a specific
route to be taken. One relatively new concept is so exciting that it should
be openi, considered: a computerized model of the state's coastal zone.
Admittedly a complicated process, the idea is not beyond the scope of a
state agency; already such a model is being developed for the entire state
of California.68
A similar operation was the guided development of the planned city
"Columbia. ' 69 The Columbia Economic Model is a computerized
accumulation of the city's maps, charts, graphs, and developmental data
that tells management at any given moment where the city is in its trek
towards programmed development. 0 This computerized approach,
enlarged to include data from the full coastal zone, will allow planners to
Id. at 208-09.
"HAWAII REv. STAT. § 205-11 (1968) requires total review every five years.
97S. 3354, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). However, the chief executive of Hawaii personally
believes that twenty-to-thirty year periods provide a more realistic framework. Hearings on S. 3354
at 377.
"Watt, State Planning Failure: What to Do About It, 1969-70 CRY CALIFORNIA 36.
"Sunderland, Why Columbia Succeeded Where Others Failed, MORTGAGE BANKER, June,
1970, at 10.
'OId. at 18. This computerized model allows management to control income and expenses of the
development phase; it also allows coordination of the laying of sewer lines, water pipes, and roads
and roads and "for the pact of development of every single piece of land, from service stations to
residential lots, and it accounts for this at changing prices year-by-year." Id. This is not to suggest
that the coastal authority should oversee the laying of each section of pipe or the location of each
service station. However, by projecting the effects of many kinds of development over the entire
coastal region, state officials will be able to make an intelligent decision about the quantity and type
of development that would best serve each area and the state.
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project the effects of various competing interests on present and future
land development in the coastal margin.
Regardless of the developmental technique, implementation is the
key to success. Although use of the completed plan would seem to be
axiomatic, Dr. Knauss observes that atrophy here is a serious problem:
I think the critical thing in this is that there has to be more than
just developing a master plan. Our shelves are full of master plans for
all kinds of things. If there is not the followup, if there is not the power
within a coastal zone agency to implement this plan, to make it work, I
don't care whether they develop a master plan or not. It is worthless.
We have had this happen before."
Therefore, the completed comprehensive plan should be submitted
through the NCCZA and the state-wide coordinating agency to the
legislature for approval. Once adopted, after proper notice and hearings,
the plan's concepts should be binding on all state agencies. No
government or private organization should be authorized to take major
steps in the region without a determination of compliance by the
authority.
There is presently some planning activity in North Carolina. Both
the Department of Local Affairs7 2 and the Department of
Administration's State Planning Task Force73 have taken first steps
toward the preparation of state land-use plans. The primary obstacle to
successful completion lies not in the agencies' employees, many of whom
share the environmentalists' concerns, but in the hodge-podge of
legislative statements, none of which give the proper authority,
responsibility, or scope.74
Some other states have taken the planning function more seriously,
although only Hawaii, of all the states, has a combined program of
state-wide planning and zoning75 coupled with some concentration of
power to enforce the plan once adopted. 76 On the other hand, the
function of most state planning offices is exemplified by Delaware's
statutory scheme where the primary responsibility of the planning office
"Hearings on S. 2802 at 64.
nN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-323 (Supp. 1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-341 (Supp. 1969).
7A dated but relevant comment summarizes states' efforts in the field of planning. Comment,
Recent Trends in State Planning Legislation: A Selective Survey, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 801 (1967).
1HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -15 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
11HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 205-12 to -13 (1968).
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is to advise other departments and to attempt to coordinate the state's
growth and development in an unspecified fashion.7
The Northern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC)78 is
specifically limited in authority by statute: "[T]he Commission shall act
solely as an advisory body. . . .[Its plans and recommendations shall
have no binding effect . . -.I This honorific position has
understandably limited the effectiveness of the commission's work." The
NIPC's primary strength lies in its responsibility to formulate
comprehensive plans for the region and to aid the voluntary cooperation
of local units of government.8' NIPC's public information program,82 if
developed to statutory limits, would aid in implementation.
Oregon has chosen the route of forcing local participation by threat
of state government. Those counties that initiate satisfactory plans of
their own will be allowed to administer planning as they choose; those
that procrastinate face intervention by the governor and the imposition
of a State-drawn plan.Y The threat has produced the intended result: The
governor of Oregon reports that planning efforts are underway in all
thirty-six of the stite's counties."
Texas, in addition to the planning power of the state's executive, has
also turned over to local government part of the burden through the
creation of "regional planning commissions." 5 These are voluntary
associations of two or more local governments that attempt to
coordinate planning for the area involved.
Planning on a comprehensive basis is a vital ingredient in the
Stratton Commission's formula. It is vital as well to the continued well-
being of North Carolina's coast line in years to come. Practically, a
total program of comprehensive planning is needed to support the
necessary regulation along the coast; this is both to insure that fair
administration occurs and to provide the substantive background for
regulation required by the courts. 6
17DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4904 (Supp. 1968).
781LL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1101-1139 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
"ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 1117 (Supp. 1970).
"0See generally Yackley, Amid a Thicket of Governments-Regional Planning in Northeastern
Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 348 (1970).
"ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 1118-1126, as amended, (Supp. 1970).
"ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 1125 (Supp. 1970).
"Oaa. REv. STAT. § 215.505 (1969).
"Hearings on S. 3354 at 385.
5TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1011 m § 3 (Supp. 1970).
"See annotation discussing the importance of comprehensive planning in establishing the
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REGULATION: CUMULATIVE AREA-WIDE ZONING
The concept of cumulative zoning is not a new one; it is, in its
modern setting, still a primary tool of regulation employed by units of
local government.8 7 Non-cumulative zoning permits only a single use for
each area: Land designated "agricultural" can be used only for
agricultural development; "residential," only for residential. However,
cumulative zoning allows the land to be used in the manner indicated by
the zoning designation and also in any manner that would be permitted
under any more restrictive designation. For example, "residential I,"
often the most restrictive zoning unit, would countenance no other use of
the land, while less restrictive designations (such as "light industrial")
would allow the land to be used as designated or in any more restrictive
manner (such as "residential I"), but not in a less restrictive manner
(such as "heavy industrial"). This writer suggests that effective
regulation of the coastal zone can also be accomplished through an
extension of this concept.
Relying on the approved comprehensive plan for the coastal region,
a coastal-zone authority would, after proper notice and hearings, apply
specific guidelines from the legislature to arrive at zone-unit designations
(ZUD) for all the land covered by the program. The completed and
approved ZUDs would then be impressed on an official map and sent,
along with pertinent regulations and data, to local officials.
Subject to changes in keeping with the program's development, the
following are offered as tentative zone-unit designations:
1) Primative: an area with strong ecological significance and little or no
change from its natural state; no manmade alterations would be allowed.
2) Limited recreational: an area traditionally or potentially well-suited
for quiet family recreation activities; widely spaced single-family
dwellings and rough improvements, such as dirt roads, would be
allowed.
3) Standard recreational: an area traditionally or potentially well-suited
for large-scale family vacationing and commercial camping; hard-
surfaced roads, motels of specified size, more concentrated dwellings,
and light commercial enterprises of the amusement and vacation-
support type would be allowed.
validity of zoning ordinances: 58 Am. JUR. Zoning § 27 (1961); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 30 (1958). See
also Schloss v. Jamison, 262 N.C. 108, 117, 136 S.E.2d 691, 700 (1964).
aBSee generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); P. GREEN, ZONING IN NORTH
CAROLINA (1952).
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4) Residential: standard residential development would be allowed with
maximum concentration levels set at the state level.
5) Light commercial/resort: commercial development, with maximum
limits set at the state level, and high-density beach and resort
development would be allowed.
Because of the potential impact on the environment of any
subdivision or heavy industrial development, any such projects would
have to obtain permits fr9m both local and state authorities. In addition,
the coastal authority should have the authority to apply legislative
guidelines to grant variances above the ZUD where it is demonstrated
that the development in question would not cause irreparable harm to
the environment, would be reasonably consistent with the comprehensive
plan, and would be in the best interests of the state.
The concept of cumulative zoning is extended in this proposal to
include a form of cumulative control whereby local government officials
would retain considerable control over the direction and extent of local
development, with only an ultimate authority reserved at the area or
state level. For example, under this proposal a local government in an
area that receives a ZUD of "light commercial/resort" would have full
authority to allow or not to allow development, with state-level
concurrence required only for heavy industrial and subdivision projects.
Even those areas with more restrictive ZUDs would be subject to full
local control up to the restrictive level thus established.
Under this proposal the General Assembly and the officers of state
government could insure that coastal development be consistent with the
best interests of all North Carolinians, and not only those who reside in
the Eastern part of the state. At the same time, control over local land
use, for the most part, would remain with locally elected officials so that
in most instances, where proposed development would be consistent with
traditional developmental patterns, there would be no state or regional
interference at all.
As the Stratton Commission pointed out, the full program of
coastal management should include an extensive program of land
acquisition and development, coupled with developmental projects.
Regulation, however, whereby the land owner retains the increments of
ownership subject only to restrictions placed on the land's use, offers
definite advantages as an environmental-protection tool. Whereas the
prohibitive cost of purchase would preclude a wide-scale attack in so
large an area, a program of regulation can be initiated simply and
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administered efficiently through the existing framework of government.
Even beyond the purchase expenditure, acquisition necessarily implies
continued state management and therefore continued expense; regulation
assumes that, subject to the restrictions, full management control will
remain with the individual landowner.
To be sure, a comprehensive program such as has been suggested in
this comment would require careful drafting to insure compliance with
constitutional requirements. However, an appraisal of the existing North
Carolina statutes and case law concerning zoning and regulating
indicates that such compliance would not be a difficult task. Two major
questions must be answered: Under what conditions may the power to
zone be transferred? At what point will the line between regulating and
taking be crossed?
Transfer of Power
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has said many times that
"[a]ll of the original zoning power of the State reposes in the General
Assembly.""8 In previous legislative acts, this power was first transferred
to cities and incorporated townships,89 and the grant was specifically
upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court." Similar authority was
later given to the counties,9" and this too was upheld. 92 To date, these are
the only grants of the zoning power, although the Assembly has
authorized the creation of "Regional Planning Commissions." The
functions of these commissions include plotting land use for potentially
large areas, but the authority is purely advisory.93
The major roadblock to a transfer of the zoning power would come
from article I I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution which
provides that the "legislative authority shall be vested in two distinct
branches, both dependent on the people. . . ." Under this article it has
been held that the General Assembly may not transfer or delegate its
legislative duties.94 However, there are at least two theories under which
"sSee, e.g., Marren v. Gamble, 237 N.C. 680, 686, 75 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1953); See also Zopfi v.
City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430,433, 160 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1968).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-172 to -181.2 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
"Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430,434, 160 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1968).
9'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153-251 to -266.22 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
"Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 162, 166 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153-276 to -283 (1964).
"State v. Curtis, 230 N.C. 169, 171, 52 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1949).
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cumulative area-wide zoning could withstand an attack based on article
II. First, the court has noted that "[w]hile the Legislature may not
ordinarily delegate its power to make laws, it may nevertheless make
laws and delegate the power to subordinate divisions of the Government
to determine facts or state of things upon which the law shall become
effective."915 Therefore the General Assembly could, and should, set out
with specificity the criteria to be used by the coastal authority in
applying the zone-unit designations and then allow the authority to
make commensurate determination of the facts upon which the law shall
become effective.
Another response to attack under article II finds support in the
recent words of Justice I. Beverly Lake who, speaking for a unanimous
court, said that the power to zone could be transferred as "an
exception" to the general rule. 6 He explained that transfer of the zoning
power was "established by custom in most, if not all, of the states."
And, although the document itself does not directly speak to the
question, Justice Lake inferred that such transfer occurs "under the
Constitution of North Carolina. ' '97
It is implicit, of course, that the General Assembly cannot transfer
more power than it possesses. Beyond this, however, the only serious
obstacle to cumulative area-wide zoning lies in establishing a guideline
denoting the extreme limits beyond which the regulation would be a
taking for which compensation must be granted9 8
Although state-wide or area-wide zoning is still a relatively new
concept that is yet more a product of the futuristic pen than the statute,
there is also support for approving the transfer of this power from recent
trends in sister states. Only Hawaii has a full program of planning and
zoning administered at the state level.9 9 There, the State Land
Commission classifies all land into four catagories.10
Wisconsin takes a stab at regional zoning'0' by requiring that local
governments enact a flood-plain zoning ordinance. 02 Failure to include
"Efird v. Board of Comm'rs, 219 N.C. 96, 103, 12 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1941).
"Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 162, 166 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1969).
971d.
"See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
"1HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 205-I to -15 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
'®HAWAu REV. STAT. § 205-2 (Supp. 1970).
"'See generally Kockelman, Wisconsin Water Resources Act of 1965, 2 URBAN L. ANNUAL
141 (1969).
'"Wis. STAT. ANN. § 87.30 (Supp. 1970). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971 (Supp. 1970).
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sufficient requirements in the ordinance, or failure to act at all, will
automatically mean that the state will do the job and bill the county for
the cost. 113 The act's scope is quite limited, aiming primarily at shoreline
erosion and flooding along the Great Lakes. Although it is a step in the
right direction, the act suffers greatly from a lack of coordination0 since
each county unit acts independently, and city governments may act
independently of the county governments. 10 5 Therefore, under the
Wisconsin approach, the idea of controlling growth and use for the
common good still stands inferior to intergovernmental competition. It
is this writer's conclusion that zoning by entirely political subdivision is
only a slightly dressed-up version of the present unacceptable,
Balkanized situation.
A final example of the trend toward state control is the heralded
Massachusetts "Wetlands Act of 1965."06 This legislative statement
grants to the Commissioner of Conservation a potential wealth of power
since it gives him the authority to "adopt, amend, modify or repeal
orders regulating, restricting or prohibiting dredging, filling, removing
or otherwise altering or polluting, coastal wetlands."' 107 The
Commissioner views this broadly phrased statement as "in a sense the
first step toward overall state zoning. This does give the Department of
Natural Resources the right to restrict the coastal wetlands in
Massachusetts, overriding local zoning."108
The basic concept of the Massachusetts Wetlands Act is sound.
Zoning power, however, should be transferred in a straightforward
transaction, not by the fiat of vague, broad language. Further, so vital a
program must not be limited to the wetlands themselves when so much
of the pollution comes from the contiguous dry lands.
The Line Between Regulating and Taking
This problem must be analyzed at both the federal and state levels,
although it is fair to assert that at least since 1926 the federal
Constitution has presented an extremely low hurdle for zoning
t°3Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971(6) (Supp. 1970).
" See generally Wood, Wisconsin's Requirements for Shoreland and Flood Plain Protection,
10 NAT. RES. J. 327 (1970).
O'See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 87.30 (Supp. 1970).
'MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1970).
1O7Id.
"eHearings on S. 2802 at 912.
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legislation to clear. The celebrated case of Euclid v. Ambler Really "'
established beyond question that zoning is a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power through its subordinate agencies. The trend has been
to allow ever-increasing government control over private property
interests as evidenced by Justice Douglas' often-quoted line from
Berman v. Parker:"' "It is well within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as well-controlled."'"
Additionally, the Court has been extremely reluctant even to hear zoning
cases during the past few decades, leaving the problem to state courts.
Based on the Court's refusal to take a recent California case,
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,"2 one could
reasonably conclude that it has gone out of the zoning business
altogether.
The California Supreme Court admitted in Consolidated Rock that
the zoning ordinance in question prohibited quarrying on land that had
"great value if used for rock, sand, and gravel excavation but 'no
appreciable economic value for any other purpose' "; in fact, the court
conceded that any other use but the prohibited quarrying was
"preposterous."" 3 Yet the California court refused to consider the
implementation of the ordinance a taking of the plaintiff's property and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,"' thereby allowing
the City of Los Angeles, through its zoning regulation, to close
plaintiff's business and render its property worthless.
Other states, including North Carolina, have not been willing to go
as far as the California court.15 Nor is it suggested that they should.
This writer does not suggest that area-wide zoning is a panacea for all
the coastal ills. As the Stratton Commission indicated, the attack must
be a broad one. Where lands in question can be fairly and effectively
regulated, zoning can be advantageously used. But where the regulation
10272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Hardin v. City of Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 135 S.E. 151 (1926).
110348 U.S. 26 (1954).
11id. at 33.
1157 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
"
3 id. at 517, 370 P.2d at 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
114371 U.S. 36 (1962).
"'See, e.g., Comm'r of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666
(1965). The court noted that in such a conflict "between the ecological and the constitutional, it is
plain that neither is to be consumed by the other. It is the duty of the department of conservation to
look after the former, and it is the duty of the courts to stand guard over constitutional rights." Id.
at 109, 206 N.E.2d at 671.
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would constitute a prohibited taking, other powers should be brought
into play."' Courts and legislatures in other states have come a long way
in allowing regulation.1 7 So also, the line between regulating and taking
has been drawn, and fairly, by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
North Carolina is unique among the states in that its constitution
includes nothing comparable to the provision of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution which prohibits the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. However, the state
supreme court has been willing to infer a prohibition against taking
without compensation because the "principle is so grounded in natural
equity, that it has never been denied to be a part of the law of North
Carolina.""' This theory has provided the background against which
have developed the court's tests for acceptable regulation.
There seems to be no question that under the North Carolina
Constitution a mere reduction in the value of one's property because of
the effects of a zoning regulation is not a ground for recovery against the
regulating body. In 1953, United States Senator Sam J. Ervin, then
sitting on and speaking for the state supreme court, said that the
"resultant diminution in the value of [one's] property is a misfortune
[he] must suffer as a member of organized society."' The case can be
projected to possible controversies where business development is limited
or prohibited under state-wide or region-wide zoning principles. Senator
Ervin's case involved a situation where a zoning ordinance enacted by
the City of Charlotte prohibited the operation of a business enterprise on
plaintiff's property, which was thereby reduced in value. This general
rule has prevailed even where the result is "harsh and seriously
depreciates the value of'complainant's property."120
It would seem, therefore, that the governmental agency, whether
municipal corporation or coastal-zone authority, has considerable
leeway in administering an acceptable program of land use regulation.
The most liberal statement of the test is found in a 1961 Charlotte case in
"'A coordinated approach is suggested in Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and Promote
Aesthetics Along Transportation Corridors, 17 BUFFALO L. Rav. 701 (1968).
"'See generally Knight, Proposed Systems of Coastal Zone Management: an Interim Analysis,
3 NAT. Ras. LAWYER 599 (1970). See also Weaver, National Land Policy: Historic and Emergent,
12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 719 (1965).
"'Johnson v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550,555 (1874).
"'Marren v. Gamble, 237 N.C. 680, 686, 75 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1953).
"Oln re Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 56, 197 S.E. 706, 710 (1938).
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which a change in the zoning designation resulted in a two-thirds
reduction in the value of the plaintiff's property:
"It is a general rule that zoning connot [sic] render private
property valueless. . .. [I]f the application of a zoning ordinance has
the effect of completely depriving an owner of the beneficial use of his
property by precluding all practical uses or the only use to which it is is
reasonably adapted, the ordinance is invalid."''
An opinion written by Justice, now Chief Justice, Bobbitt sets forth
the second requirement that the regulation, to be upheld, must "bear a
"substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.' 112 This 1956 decision, and others since, have generalized a
two-part test enunciated by Justice Barnhill in In re Parker:"12 I) Does
the regulation pass "the bounds of reason and [assume] the character of
a merely arbitrary fiat"? 2) Is the regulation one that has "no
substantial relation to the public safety and public welfare of the
community"? If the regulation meets these tests the court will not
interfere with its implementation unless it is "arbitrary, oppressive, or
attended with manifest abuse."'2 4 Surely, a region-wide regulatory plan
designed to protect the interests of all North Carolina's citizens would
easily pass this muster.
From the time of Parker, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
been willing to allow new concepts and new concerns to govern the
direction of its zoning decisions. The court's policy has been a wise one,
and one that has set a discernable yet flexible standard against which to
guage any zoning program. It is against these case-law statements that
the proposal submitted herein was drawn. It is believed that the program
for cumulative area-wide zoning would survive the criteria set by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. Further, the court, through various
spokesmen, has set the tone of the policy that should guide the initiation
and administration of this or any other future plan of large area
regulation. Perhaps the statement in Parker expressed it in greater
"'Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 653, 122 S.E.2d 817, 822 (1961).
1"In re O'Neal, 243 N.C. 714,719,92 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1956), quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
1"214 N.C. 51, 58, 197 S.E. 706,711 (1938).
"'Hardin v. City of Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 397, 135 S.E. 151, 152-53 (1926). See also Zopfi v.
City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430,434, 160 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1968).
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breadth, although recent spokesmen, Justice Lake12 and Chief Justice
Bobbitt,26 indicate no departure from it:
Each person holds his property with the right to use the same in
such manner as will not interfere with the rights of others, or the public
interest or requirement. It is held in subordination to the rights of
society. He may not do with it as he pleases any more than he may act
in accordance with his personal desires. The interests of society justify
restraints upon individual conduct and also upon the use to which the
property may be devoted. The provisions of the Constitution are not
intended to so protect the individual in the use of his property as to
enable him to use it to the detriment of the public. When the uses to
which the individual puts his property conflict with the interest of
society the right of the individual is subordinated to the general welfare
and incidental damage to the property resulting from governmental
activities or laws passed in the promotion of the public welfare is not
considered a taking of the property for which compensation must be
made. 127
CONCLUSION
The state of North Carolina has been blessed with rich coastal lands
and waters that at this time, while undoubtedly deteriorating, are still
relatively free from the massive pollution that has ruined the shorelines
of other states. It is only through a system of patterned, controlled
development that this condition will prevail against the ever increasing
demands for limited space. The proposal submitted here for area-wide
cumulative zoning is a plan that will allow the North Carolina General
Assembly to act as a guardian for these coastal riches that belong to all
the state's people. And, unlike other plans, this proposal will leave the
bulk of the land-use control in the hands of the local government. Such a
plan, properly administered in accordance with a total program of
coastal protection as suggested by the Stratton Commission, can protect
the state's multibillion dollar coastal resources for future generations.
The General Assembly should take its cue for dramatic legislative action
1"'See Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 166 S.E.2d 78 (1969). See also Zopfi v.
City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
1''See In re O'Neal, 243 N.C. 714, 92 S.E.2d 189 (1956). Justice Bobbitt, who authored this
1956 opinion, became Chief Justice in 1969.
1-214 N.C. 51, 57, 197 S.E. 706, 710 (1938).
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